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IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
LUTHER M. SWYGERT*t
Judicial activism traditionally uses the principles built into the
Constitution and statutory law to foster the ends of social justice.
The term connotes a liberal approach so as to read into legal norms
the essence of due process and equal protection under the law. Those
are the two most fundamental concepts of individual rights embraced
by the Constitution. Today judicial activism is under attack.'
Recently the judiciary, especially the federal judiciary, has been
criticized for exceeding its powers and invading the province of the
legislative and executive branches. In a speech before the Federal
Legal Council, the Attorney General of the United States, William
French Smith, accused the federal courts of "making unwise intru-
sions upon the legislative domain."' He explained that the policy of
the Reagan Administration regarding the federal bench is to
discourage judicial activism:
We believe that the groundswell of conservatism evidenced
by the 1980 election makes this an especially appropriate
time to urge upon the courts more principled bases [of
decisionmaking] that would diminish judicial activism....
In recent decades .... Federal courts have engaged in a
... kind of judicial policymaking. In the future, the Justice
Department will focus upon the doctrines that have led to
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The University of Notre Dame (L.L.B. 1927).
t I am indebted to my law clerk, Barbara E. Rook, for her invaluable
assistance in the research and writing of this article.
1. As it has come to be used today, the word "activism" connotes a liberal
and expanding judicial approach to legal problems. This usage, however, perverts the
true meaning of the word. A politically conservative judge may be just as active in
narrowing the application of a statute or in cutting back individual rights as a liberal
judge may be in the pursuit of what he regards as desirable social or political ends.
See Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1580 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Johnson, The
Role of the Judiciary with Respect to the Other Branches of Government, 11 GA. L. REV.
455, 469 (1977).
2. Excerpts from Smith's Prepared Remarks on Plans of Justice Department,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1981, SA, at 22, col. 1.
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the courts' activism. We will attempt to reverse this
unhealthy flow of power from state and Federal legislatures
to Federal Courts . .. .3
Some members of Congress echo the criticism voiced by the Attorney
General. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina has introduced a bill
to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear cases concerning
school prayer.4 Other bills pending before Congress would restrict
federal-court jurisdiction over cases involving abortion5 and school
3. Id.
4. S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. SS 11-12 (1979), provides in part:
Sec. 11(a) Chapter 81 of Title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
(a) Nothwithstanding the provisions of sections 1253,
1254, and 1257 of this Chapter the Supreme Court shall not
have jurisdiction to review, by appeal, writ of certiorari, or
otherwise, any case arising out of any State statute, ordinance,
rule, regulation, or any part thereof, or arising out of any
Act interpreting, applying, or enforcing a State statute, or-
dinance, rule, or regulation, which relates to voluntary prayers
in public schools and public buildings.
Sec. 12.(a) Chapter 85 of Title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
S 1364. Limitations on jurisdiction
Nothwithstanding any other provision of law, the
district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any case or ques-
tion which the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to
review under section 1259 of this title.
5. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) provides in part:
Section 1. (a) The Congress finds that the life of each human being begins
at conception.
(b) The Congress further finds that the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States protects all human beings.
Sec. 4. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no inferior Federal
court ordained and established by Congress under article III of the Con-
stitution of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, temporary or permanent injunction, or declaratory judgment in any
case involving or arising from any State law or municipal ordinance that
(1) protects the rights of human persons between conception and birth,
or (2) prohibits, limits, or regulates (a) the performance of abortions or
(b) the provision at public expense of funds, facilities, personnel, or other
assistance for the performance of abortions: Provided, That nothing in this
section shall deprive the Supreme Court of the United States of the author-
ity to render appropriate relief in any case.
The report on S. 158 by the Separation of Powers Subcommittee of the Judiciary Com-
mittee acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme Court retains full power to review the con-
stitutionality of S. 158." STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, 97TH CONG.,
1ST SESs., REPORT ON THE HUMAN LIFE BILL S. 158, 21 (Comm. Print 1981). See also Sager,
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busing.'
The idea that the courts have overstepped the bounds of judicial
Foreward: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdic-
tion of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 37 (1981) ("the independence and finality
of the Supreme Court's constitutional judgments are unimpaired by the fact that it
is evaluating a congressional limitation on jurisdiction").
6. S. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1981) provides in part:
(a) Nothwithstanding any other provision of law, no inferior court
of the United States nor any judge of any inferior court of the United
States shall have jurisdiction to issue any injunction, writ, process, order,
citation for an order with respect to contempt, rule, judgment, decree,
or command-
(1) requiring the assignment or transportation of any
student to a public elementary or secondary school operated
by a State or local educational agency for the purpose of alter-
ing the racial or ethnic composition of the student body at
any public school;
(2) requiring any State or local educational agency to
close any school and transfer the students from the closed
school to any other school for the purpose of altering the
racial or ethnic composition of the student body at any public
school ....
See also S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1981).
The constitutionality and the wisdom of the bills to limit federal-court jurisdic-
tion has already been the subject of much debate among legal scholars. Professor Ar-
chibald Cox, a former Solicitor General of the United States, discussing these bills,
stated that:
A constitutional right is at the mercy of legislative majorities unless
supported by a judicial remedy. To deprive Federal courts of jurisdiction
granted by the Constitution ... would result in a hodgepodge of inconsis-
tent state interpretations, not all of which could be expected to rise above
local selfishness or passion.
Cox, Don't Overrule the Court, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 28, 1981, at 18. Judge Irving R. Kauf-
man of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit believes that the
framers of the Constitution did not intend to give Congress the authority to restrict
the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. Kaufman, Congress versus the Court,
N.Y. TIMES MAG.. Sept. 27, 1981, at 96. He finds that "clearly, the framers did not wish
to leave to the states final authority to decide matters of Federal constitutional law.
For this reason, the argument that Congress can withdraw jurisdiction over certain
classes of Federal cases or rights because it has discretion to abolish the lower courts
does not hold up under examination." Id. at 102. Judge Kaufman concluded that "[djepriv-
ing the Federal courts of the power to adjudicate cases relating to such issues as
desegregation, abortion and school prayer effectively precludes Federal protection-
the constitutionally envisaged and most reliable form of protection-of our cherished
constitutional rights." Id. at 104. Professor Sager believes that "[a]doption of any of
the bills that are part of the proposed assault on the federal judiciary would set a
dangerous and tawdry precedent by sabotaging the integrity of the judicial process."
Sager, supra note 5, at 89. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg has
stated that "[t]o acquiesce in the removal of [federal court] jurisdiction would be to
alter the substance of established constitutional law, to surrender the 'citadel' of equal
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review and usurped legislative and executive powers is not new.7 In
fact, it has been around since the adoption of the Constitution. Chief
Justice Marshall's landmark decision in Marbury v. Madison,8 holding
that the Supreme Court had the power to declare acts of Congress
unconstitutional,9 engendered much controversy. Criticism of the
Supreme Court's activism enjoyed a renaissance during the 1920s and
1930s, when the Court struck down much of the economic and business
legislation of the day,"° and again during the years of the Warren
Court, which was accused of acting as a "super-legislature,"" especially
justice, and to breach the separation of judicial and legislative powers." Address by
the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg in Honor of Justice Hugo L. Black, 24 ALA. L. REV.
255, 263 (1972). See also the authorities cited in Sager, supra, at 20 n.7. But see Berger,
Congressional Contraction of Federal Jurisdiction, 1980 Wisc. L. REV. 801.
Bills to limit federal court jurisdiction are not new. For example, the Jenner
bill, proposed in 1957 would have eliminated Supreme Court jurisdiction in cases in-
volving (1) the practices of congressional committees, (2) the federal government's en-
forcement of security regulations pertaining to federal employees, (3) state regulation
of intrastate "subversive activities," (4) school board regulation of "subversive activities"
of teachers, and (5) state regulation of admission to the state bar. S. 2646, 85th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1957), discussed in Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals in Congress, 33 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 597 (1958). The Tuck bill, proposed in 1964 in response to the Supreme Court
decisions in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), would have eliminated the district court's original jurisdiction and the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction of state legislatures. H.R. 11926, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1964), reprinted in 110 CONG. REC. 20285 (Aug. 19, 1964). In 1972 a bill was introduced
in Congress to restrict the power of federal courts to order busing as a remedy for
school segregation. H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), discussed in Thompson &
Pollit, Congressional Control of Judicial Remedies: President Nizon's Proposed Moratorium
on "Busing" Orders, 50 N.C. L. REV. 809 (1972). None of these bills was ever enacted
into law.
7. See Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385, 386-87
(1969); McKay, The Supreme Court as an Instrument of Law Reform, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J.
387, 389 (1969).
8. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
9. Id. at 178.
10. See A. Cox. THE WARREN COURT 2 (1968); R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, xii-xiii, 39-74 (1941); Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a
Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 n.5 (1968).
11. See, e.g., Laub, The Judge's Role in a Changing Society, 53 JUDICATURE 140,
141 (1969); McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Dilemma of Judicial Policy-Making,
39 MINN. L. REV. 837 (1955); Wright, supra note 10. That criticism came not only from
commentators, but also from within the ranks of the Court itself. See, e.g., Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
[T]hese decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Con-
stitution and the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in a nut-
shell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in
some constitutional "principle," and that this Court should "take the lead"
in promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act. The
Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 [1982], Art. 1
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in the areas of desegregation,12 reapportionment, 3 criminal procedure,'
and prisoners' rights. 5
Inasmuch as I am, admittedly, one of the so-called "activist"
judges, I must respond to these critics, both past and present, by
saying that they fail to recognize the basic principles of our constitu-
tional system of government and the structural realities of our political
system. It is my contention that judges who have made activist deci-
sions have not done so out of any desire to preempt the powers of
other branches of government or to impose their individual political
or social philosophies on others. But when other branches of govern-
ment failed to take action, the courts acted in order to enforce the
provisions of the Constitution.
I. DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE COURTS
Many commentators have characterized the judicial branch as
undemocratic and therefore inconsistent with our form of government.
Professor Commager, writing almost thirty years ago, called judicial
review "a drag ... upon democracy,"'6 and, more recently, Professor
Bickel referred to the Supreme Court as "a deviant institution in the
American democracy." 7 The question often asked is: "Why should a
majority of nine Justices appointed for life be permitted to outlaw
as unconstitutional the acts of elected officials or of officers control-
led by elected officials?" 8
There are two answers to this criticism. First, there are checks
on the power of the federal courts. When the courts are interpreting
legislation, their decisions are subject to change by the Congress. 9
Even when a decision is based on the Constitution, it may be altered
should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general
haven for reform movements.
12. See Bennett & Quade, The Court as Legislator: A Crucial Symptom, 10
ST. LouIs U.L.J. 92, 92-93 (1965).
13. Id. at 94.
14. Id. at 93.
15. Gallington, Prison Disciplinary Decisions, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 152, 156
(1969).
16. H. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 56 (1943).
17. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962). See also R. NEELY, How
COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 8 (1981).
18. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1952).
19. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 6
(1980).
1982]
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through the procedure of constitutional amendment.' Another political
check on the courts is the power of the President to appoint all federal
judges and Supreme Court Justices, subject to the approval of the
Senate.21
There are other informal checks on the power of the federal
courts. The Executive Branch may simply refuse to enforce a court
order,' or lower courts may decline to follow the decision of a higher
court.' Further, Congress can use its spending power to frustrate
enforcement of a judicial mandate.' Finally, several commentators have
argued persuasively that the power of the courts is subject in the
final analysis to the power of the people to accept or reject the prin-
ciples expounded by their courts." As Professor Bickel stated:
The Supreme Court's judgments may be put forth as univer-
sally prescriptive; but they actually become so only when
they gain widespread assent. They bind of their own force
no one but the parties to a litigation. To realize the pro-
mise that all others similarly situated will be similarly
bound, the Court's judgments need the assent and the
cooperation first of the political institutions, and ultimately
of the people."
The second answer to the criticism that the courts are
undemocratic is that our system of government is not a pure
democracy. The dictionary definition of democracy is "government by
the people: rule of the majority,"' but our Constitution contains
several provisions that call for nonmajoritarian elements in the gov-
ernment, 8 of which the courts are only one example. The Constitu-
tion itself is protected from changes desired by a mere majority by
20. U.S. CONST. art. V. See L. LEVY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT
12 (1967).
21. U.S. CONST. art. II S 2. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF PROGRESS 88 (1978).
22. See J. CHOPER, supra note 19, at 56.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 56; L. LEVY, supra note 20, at 12 ("Judicial review would never
have flourished had the people been opposed to it .... [Ilt exists by the tacit consent
of the governed.").
26. A. BICKEL, supra note 21, at 90.
27. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1963).
28. See Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099,
1109 (1977).
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss3/1
1982] JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Article V, which requires more than a simple majority to enact
amendments.'
Our constitutional system embodies the principle of majority rule
but limits the power of majorities by guaranteeing certain individual
rights which cannot be abridged, even by the majority. Several com-
mentators have concluded that the courts are undemocratic, but prop-
erly so.' Those who argue that equating democracy with majoritar-
ianism is too simplistic attempt to integrate the courts into their
theory by defining "democracy" broadly so as to include the role of
the judicial branch." Whether the courts are characterized as consis-
tent or inconsistent with anyone's political definition of democracy
is unimportant. What is important is that the Constitution guarantees
certain individual rights to those whose interests may not be protected
through the traditional democratic processes, and that the courts are
the guardians of those rights. As Justice Jackson once noted, "The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts."3 2
29. Other examples of the framers' distrust of popular majorities include ar-
ticle I's provision for the election of Senators by state legislatures rather than by
the people directly, and the electoral college system of electing the President required
by article II.
30. E.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 21, at 83 ("Our government is not, and ought
not to be, strictly majoritarian."); Mace, The Antidemocratic Character of Judicial Review,
60 CALIF. L. REV. 1140, 1149 (1972) ("the character of judicial review is properly
antidemocratic").
31. E.g., Bishin, supra note 28, at 1137 ("Judicial review helps American govern-
ment make tolerable accommodations between personal and group rule and therefore
seems sufficiently in line with the purposes of the 'American democracy' to qualify
as one of the acceptable devices for achieving them."); Rostow, supra note 18, at 197
("democracies need not elect all the officers who exercise crucial authority .... The
independence of judges ...has been the pride of communities which aspire to be
free."). This point was made perhaps most eloquently by Justice Donald Wright, formerly
of the California Supreme Court:
The Constitution envisions that democracy includes the right of the minor-
ity to attempt to become the majority. And a constitutional democracy
recognizes the right of the minority to be protected from the arbitrariness
or, in some instances, the tyranny of the majority. When forces within
our system would abridge these rights, the court must intervene and pro-
tect those who have proved unable to protect themselves. In this con-
text, judicial review of legislative acts may run counter to the will or
the wish of the majority, but to say that judicial review is undemocratic
is to ignore fundamental rights guaranteed to all, including the members
of the minority.
Wright, The Role of the Judiciary: From Marbury to Anderson, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1262,
1265 (1972).
32. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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II. THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
Some commentators have argued that the Founding Fathers
never intended the Supreme Court to be the primary check on abuses
of power by the states and the other branches of government. 33 They
relied in part on the position taken by the Jeffersonian Democrats
during the late eighteenth century that the Supreme Court was too
powerful and that the legislative branch should predominate.3 4 Other
scholars have found ample evidence for the conclusion that "the courts
were intended from the beginning to have the power that they have
exercised."' Justice Jackson believed that "[ilt is probable that many,
and it is certain that some, members of the Constitutional Conven-
tion appreciated that [the clause providing for the judicial power and
the supremacy clause] would spell out a power in the Supreme Court
to pass on the constitutionality of federal legislation," although he
noted that the judicial power was "the least debated of any of the
important implications of the instrument."'
James Madison, speaking at the congressional debate on the Bill
of Rights, stated:
If [these amendments] are incorporated into the Con-
stitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardian of those
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the Legislative or the Executive;
they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the
declaration of rights. 37
This statement shows a recognition by Madison of the powerful role
the federal courts would necessarily play in protecting individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution from infringement by the legislative
or executive branches. Further evidence that the Founding Fathers
intended the courts to have the power to interpret the Constitution
and provide the ultimate check on the other branches of government
may be found in Alexander Hamilton's essay, The Federalist No. 78:
33. See, e.g., Mason, supra note 7, at 393.
34. See A. Cox, supra note 10, at 1-3, 93.
35. Rostow, supra note 18, at 195. Accord, Goldberg, Address by the Honorable
Arthur J. Goldberg in Honor of Justice Hugo L. Black, 24 ALA. L. REV. 255, 257 (1972);
Johnson, supra note 1, at 464.
36. R. JACKSON. supra note 10, at 4.
37. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS. 1st Cong., 439 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789), quoted
in Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 575, 581
(1967).
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Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts
to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the
constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doc-
trine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the
legislative power ...
... [Tihe courts were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature, in order, among
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned
to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the pro-
per and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is,
in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamen-
tal law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its mean-
ing as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding
from the legislative body.'
These statements of the framers and the provisions of the Con-
stitution itself demonstrate that the federal courts must have the
authority to declare acts of Congress, state legislative enactments,
and executive actions unconstitutional. The supremacy clause made
the Constitution the supreme law of the land, but "maintaining the
supremacy of the Constitution [requires] a strong and independent
judiciary, possessing the power and the authority to resolve disputes
of a constitutional nature between the states, between the states and
the national government, and, most importantly, between individuals
and governmental institutions."' Both Madison' and Hamilton 1 knew
that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution would mean little
without a federal judiciary to enforce its provisions.
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 228-29 (R.
Fairfield ed.) (2d ed. 1966).
39. Johnson, supra note 1, at 464.
40. See id.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 38, at 228:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand
one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authori-
ty; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-
post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved
in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice,
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor
of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
1982]
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III. THE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES
It is certainly true that the legislative and executive branches
are as bound by the principles of the Constitution as are the federal
courts. Nevertheless, the structure of our system of government makes
it imperative that there be an independent judicial branch to ensure
that the states and the other two branches of government adhere to
the constitutional limitations on their power; no other branch of
government is so capable of preserving the integrity of the constitu-
tional safeguards.
A. The Legislative Branch
Legislators are not independent or disinterested; rather, they
are politicians who are answerable to the voters who put them into
office. They must run on their records and therefore are preoccupied
with the possible political consequences of the positions they take on
various issues." Legislators are more often subject to significant time
pressures; the schedule of a legislative session will be crowded with
many bills to be considered,43 and legislators, in addition to working
on legislative business, must participate in political activities and spend
time in their home districts.
Legislation is often the product of long, hard-fought negotiation
and compromise. Powerful interest groups employ lobbyists to in-
fluence legislators' votes on pending bills. Further, legislators must
consider the majority of situations to which a law will apply, and poten-
tial negative consequences for individuals or minority groups may be
outweighed by potential benefits, or even unknown at the time a bill
is under consideration.
B. The Executive Branch
An examination of the structure of the executive branch reveals
limitations similar to those of the legislature. Executive officials are
answerable directly or indirectly to the electorate; therefore, their
decisions, like those of legislators, are influenced by what would be
politically safe or popular. Executive and administrative officials are
also subject to political pressures from constituencies and interest-
group lobbyists. Moreover, although executive officials often act on
42. See C. BREITEL, THE COURTS AND LAWMAKING IN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS TODAY
AND TOMORROW 1, 7 (M. Paulsen ed. 1959).
43. See Keaton, Judicial Law Reform-A Perspective on the Performance of Ap-
pellate Courts, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1254, 1262 (1966); Tate, The Law-making Function of the
Judge, 28 LA. L. REV. 211, 232 (1968).
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a problem more quickly than legislators, such actions may be in
response to a political storm or a public whim.
C. The Judiciary
An independent judiciary is institutionally suited to safeguarding
constitutional principles. Federal judges are not answerable to any
constituency and are thus insulated from most political pressures. They
are therefore in a better position than legislators or executive officials
to protect the constitutional rights of individuals, even when that re-
quires a politically unpopular decision.
The other two branches of government and the states may simply
refuse to act," but a court, when presented with a concrete case, must
make a decision.'5 Many commentators have noted that the courts are
most often criticized for activist decisions in cases in which state
governments or the other branches of the federal government could
have acted to prevent or remedy constitutional violations but failed
to do so."6 Further, with an actual case before it, a court can deal
with the possible unforeseen effects of a law on an individual.7 Finally,
the absence of direct political responsibility on judges and the
"deliberative, contemplative" nature of the judicial process results in
more thoughtful decisions.48
IV. "ACTIVIST" DECISIONS OF THE PAST
To support my contention that activist judicial decisions are the
result of judges fulfilling their duty to uphold the Constitution and
not the result of any judicial usurpation of power, I rely on an ex-
44. Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, Foreward: Constitutional Adjudica-
tion and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 122 (1966) ("If one arm
of government cannot or will not solve an insistent problem, the pressure falls upon
another").
45. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 474-75; Wright, supra note 31, at 1267-68.
I recognize of course that a court decision will not always reach the merits of a claim.
46. Cox, supra note 37, at 592 ("I suspect that a careful study would reveal
that the Supreme Court today is most 'activist' in the areas of the law where political
processes have been inadequate, because the problem was neglected by politicians.");
Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEx. L. REV. 903, 905 (1976)
("On far too many occasions the intransigent and unremitting opposition of state of-
ficials who have neglected or refused to correct unconstitutional or unlawful state
policies and practices has necessitated federal intervention to enforce the law."); Mason,
supra note 7, at 408 ("failure of the states to protect individual liberties or undertake
corrective measures drove the Court ... into untrodden fields").
47. See Wright, supra note 31, at 1267-68.
48. See J. CHOPER, supra note 19, at 67-68.
19821
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amination of some past decisions. These decisions were criticized at
the time as examples of the federal courts' overstepping the bounds
of judicial review and resolving questions more properly left to the
legislative or executive branches. Looking at these decisions with the
benefit of hindsight, however, will show that the constitutional rights
of individuals had been violated and that the legislative or executive
branches could have acted but failed to do so. It was thus left to the
federal courts to safeguard the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
A. Reapportionment
As recently as 1946, the Supreme Court refused to consider a
constitutional challenge to a state districting plan. In Colegrove v.
Green,49 the plaintiffs alleged that the Illinois legislature had failed
to reapportion congressional districts since 1901, and that the great
changes in the population distribution in the intervening forty-five
years made the 1901 map unfair and unrepresentative. The three-judge
district court dismissed the complaint,' and the Supreme Court af-
firmed on the ground that "due regard for the effective working of
our Government reveal[s] this issue to be of a peculiarly political
nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."'"
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the plurality,' stated that:
Courts ought not to enter this political thicket. The remedy
for unfairness in districting is to secure State legislatures
that will apportion properly, or to invoke the ample powers
of Congress .... The Constitution has left the performance
of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on
the fidelity of the executive and legislative action and,
ultimately, on the vigilance of the people in exercising their
political rights."
Justice Black disagreed:
What is involved here is the right to vote guaranteed by
the Federal Constitution. It has always been the rule that
where a federally protected right has been invaded the
federal courts will provide the remedy to rectify the wrong
49. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
50. 64 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
51. 328 U.S. at 552.
52. Justices Reed and Burton concurred in Justice Frankfurter's opinion;
Justice Rutledge concurred in a separate opinion. Justice Black dissented, and Justices
Douglas and Murphy joined in his dissent.
53. 328 U.S. at 556.
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done. Federal courts have not hesitated to exercise their
equity power in cases involving deprivation of property and
liberty .... There is no reason why they should do so where
the case involves the right to choose representatives that
make laws affecting liberty and property."
The problems with the remedy for malapportionment suggested
by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove-resort to the state legislatures
or Congress-are apparent. It is unrealistic to expect legislators to
vote to correct malapportionment in the very districts that put them
into office." But to allow malapportioned districts to remain in the
absence of legislative action would fly in the face of the constitutional
guarantee of the right to vote, which would be jeopardized if the
voting strength of some persons or groups could be diluted or
destroyed by those in power. The inaction of state legislatures and
Congress thus made it clear that it was up to the federal judiciary
to preserve this constitutional right."
As Professor Auerbach has noted,57 it is anomalous for critics
of judicial activism to suggest that the courts defer to the legislative
branch on questions of apportionment. The idea that legislative ac-
tion or inaction merits deference from the courts is based on the
assumption that such action is the product of a vote by the majority
of representatives who were elected by a majority of the voters, but
malapportionment effectively destroys that assumption.5
54. Id. at 574 (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
55. Wright, supra note 10, at 20. Accord, Lewis, Legislative Apportionment
and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1091 (1958):
Legislative fairness in districting is inhibited by factors built into
our political structure. Once a group has the dominant position . . . its
overriding interest is to maintain that position. The motives of most in-
dividual legislators are just as selfish. Any substantial changes in districts
means that the members must face new constituents and deal with
uncertainties- in short undergo risks that few politicians would volun-
tarily put upon themselves. Voting for a fair apportionment would in many
cases mean voting oneself out of office. That is too much to ask of most
politicians.
56. See A. Cox, supra note 10, at 117-18 ("the cancer of malapportionment would
continue to grow unless the Court excised it"); Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases:
One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value, 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 70; Johnson, supra
note 46, at 906; Lewis, supra note 55, at 1095; Wright, supra note 10, at 20-22; Wright,
supra note 31, at 1267.
57. Auerbach, supra note 56, at 2.
58. See id. See also R. NEELY. supra note 17, at 14 ("Both majority rule and
effective participatory democracy were denied by a self-serving structure which had
little or no rational justification").
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Access to the legislative process in a truly representative
democracy must be open to all citizens. Therefore, the integrity of
the political process must be preserved. Because the legislative branch
cannot or will not perform this function, it is the responsibility of
the courts to ensure that the principle -of one-man/one-vote is effec-
tuated in our federal and state electoral systems.
In 1964, in Reynolds v. Sims59 and its companion cases, the
Supreme Court recognized its duty to protect the constitutional rights
of those citizens whose right to vote had been infringed by
malapportionment.' In the majority opinion in Reynolds, Chief Justice
Warren stated:
Since the achieving of fair and effective representation for
all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative appor-
tionment, we conclude that the Equal Protection Clause
guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all
voters in the election of ... legislators .... We are cau-
tioned about the dangers of entering into political thickets
and mathematical quagmires. Our answer is this: a denial
of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protec-
tion; our oath and our office require no less of us."1
The continuing need for federal court action in protecting the
59. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
60. Apparently, some commentators view Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
as the Supreme Court's turning point in the area of reapportionment. See, e.g., R.
NEELY. supra note 17, at 14; Bennett & Quade, supra note 12, at 94. I nevertheless choose
to rely on Reynolds because in Baker, the Court expressly declined to overrule Cole-
grove, finding that its holding that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear appor-
tionment cases was not inconsistent with the decision of the Court in Colegrove to
refuse to intervene in this "political arena." Baker, 369 U.S. at 202. Further, the Court's
holding in Baker was limited to the finding that the courts had the subject-matter
jurisdiction, and it was not until 1964 that the Court actually exercised its power to
declare a reapportionment scheme unconstitutional, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.
1, 7 (1964), and to set out constitutional standards for apportionment, Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 568. 577-85 (1964).
61. 377 U.S. at 565-66. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, dissented
in Baker, 369 U.S. at 266, 330 ("the case is of that class of political controversy which
• . . is unfit for federal judicial action"). Justice Harlan also dissented in Wesberry,
376 U.S. at 20, 48 ("the Court attempts to effect reforms in a field which the Constitu-
tion . . . has committed exclusively to the political process"), and Reynolds, 377 U.S.
at 589, 624 ("these decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitu-
tion and the constitutional function of this Court ... [which] is that every major social
ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 'principle,' and that this
Court should 'take the lead' in promoting reform when other branches of government
fail to act").
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss3/1
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
constitutional right to vote is evidenced by recent challenges to malap-
portioned legislative districting plans.2 This responsibility is one the
courts cannot and must not abdicate in deference to the legislative
branch of government if the Constitution is to be preserved as the
supreme law of the land.
B. Prisoners' Rights
I have witnessed a great change in the development of the law
on prisoners' rights during my years on the bench. Originally, courts
routinely relied on the "hands-off" doctrine in refusing to review
prisoners' complaints charging inhuman treatment and civil rights
violations.' Even as recently as 1960, a federal district court dismissed
a prisoner's complaint alleging that prison officials had failed to pro-
vide him proper medical treatment; the court found that "to allow
such actions would be prejudicial to the proper maintenance of [prison]
discipline.""'
Courts and commentators offered several justifications for the
hands-off doctrine. First, it was said that the administration of federal
prisons was entrusted to the discretion of the executive branch 5 and
therefore judicial intervention would violate the principle of separa-
tion of powers."' Second, principles of federalism dictate that federal
courts should not interfere in the administration of state prisons."
62. E.g., In re: Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases, No.
81 C 3915 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1981); Rybicki v. State Board of Elections of the State
of Illinois, Nos. 81 C 6030, 81 C 6052, 81 C 6093 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1982).
63. On the hands-off doctrine, see generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the
Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506 (1963).
64. Golub v. Krimsky, 185 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
65. See Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1952) ("Since the prison
system of the United States is entrusted to the Bureau of Prisons . . . the courts
have no power to supervise the discipline of the prisoners nor to interfere with their
discipline."); Sutton v. Settle, 302 F.2d 286, 288 (8th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) ("Courts
have uniformly held that supervision of inmates of federal institutions rests with the
proper administrative authorities and that courts have no power to supervise the
management and disciplinary rules of such institutions").
66. See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 175, 181 (1970); Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of
the Decline of the "Hands-Off' Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795, 797 (1977); Millemann,
Protected Inmate Liberties: A Case for Judicial Responsibility, 53 Or. L. Rev. 29, 36 (1973).
67. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974); Siegel v. Ragen, 180
F.2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950) ("The Government of the United States is not concerned
with, nor has it the power to control or regulate, the internal discipline of the penal
institutions of its constituent states."); Haas, supra note 66, at 797; Millemann, supra
note 66, at 36-37.
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Third, judges lack expertise and experience in prison administration.
The failure of both executive officials and legislators to take ac-
tion to remedy the shocking conditions that exist in our penal institu-
tions has caused the demise of the hands-off doctrine. 9 As the Supreme
Court recognized,
[a] policy of judicial restraint cannot encompass any failure
to take cognizance of valid constitutional claims whether
arising in a federal or state institution. When a prison
regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional
guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to pro-
tect constitutional rights."
The inaction on the part of executive officials and legislators is
the result of several factors. Prison officials often take no initiative
in instituting reform because of "bureaucratic inertia."7 Further, prison
administrators are limited by budgetary constraints beyond their
control. 2 Legislators have few incentives to appropriate funds for
upgrading prison conditions; prisoners are an unpopular minority
whose plight engenders little public support, especially at a time when
68. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405; Goldfarb & Singer, supra note
66, at 181; Haas, supra note 66, at 797; Millemann, supra note 66, at 36.
69. See Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d
392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted):
The failure in the past of legislators to take the proper correctional ac-
tion to remedy these inhuman conditions for both detainees and convicted
prisoners has eroded the historical reluctance of federal courts to interfere
with the administration of penal institutions .... Indeed this failure has
required the courts to take action in the interests of fundamental decency
and the protection of the constitutional rights of the inmates.
See also Johnson, supra note 46, at 907; Haas, supra note 66, at 808; Judicial Interven-
tion in Corrections: The California Experience-An Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A. 452,
553-54 (1973) [hereinafter cited as UCLA STUDY].
70. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405-06. See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319, 321 (1972) (per curiam):
Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the con-
stitutional rights of all "persons," including prisoners. We are not unmindful
that prison officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of
prison affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are subject to appropriate
rules and regulations. But persons in prison, like other individuals, have
the right to petition the Government for redress of grievances ....
71. UCLA STUDY, supra note 69, at 555.
72. Millemann, supra note 66, at 40; UCLA STUDY, supra note 69, at 554. See
also Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d at 399 ("Inade-
quate resources or finances can never be an excuse for depriving [prisoners] of their
constitutional rights").
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss3/1
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
there is a growing concern about crime."3 Prisoners themselves are
often disenfranchised, ' and a disproportionately large number of them
come from racial and socioeconomic groups that are politically
powerless. 5 It is therefore not surprising that inhuman conditions in
prisons have persisted despite the power of legislators and ad-
ministrators to initiate improvements.
Federal judges are not anxious to intervene in the administration
of prisons, but they have been forced to do so by the continued inac-
tion of state and federal executive officials and legislators. For the
judges to do otherwise would be an abrogation of their duty to uphold
the Constitution.
In 1977, I sat on the panel that heard the case of Green v.
Carlson." In that case, the plaintiff was the mother of a prisoner who
had been incarcerated at the federal penitentiary at Terre Haute, In-
diana. The plaintiff alleged that her son had been admitted to the
prison hospital suffering from a serious asthma attack, that no physi-
cian was on duty and none was called during the eight-hour period
the prisoner was in this condition, and that as a result of injections
by an unlicensed nurse of a drug inappropriate for the treatment of
asthma, the prisoner died. The district court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that under state law, the cause of action did not sur-
vive the decedent.77 The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the
anomalous result of that holding would allow recovery for injury but
not death." We found that whether or not a federal civil rights ac-
tion survives must be a question of federal common law because "[tihe
liability of federal agents for violation of constitutional rights should
not depend upon where the violation occurred."7 9 We went on to hold
that under the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. Gamble,' the
plaintiffs complaint in Green stated a claim. In Estelle, the Court
recognized that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisons constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'...
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.""1
73. See Millemann, supra note 66, at 38-39, 54; Comment, Confronting the Con-
ditions of Confinement: An Expanded Role for Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 367, 386 (1977).
74. See Millemann, supra note 66, at 38-39.
75. See Comment, supra note 73, at 386.
76. 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978).
77. Id. at 671 n.3.
78. Id. at 674.
79. Id. at 675.
80. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
81. Id. at 104 (citations omitted).
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It seems incredible to think that only a few years ago a prisoner
in similar circumstances was without a remedy in federal court. To-
day, it is settled that the deprivation of basic human rights in
prison amounts to a constitutional violation that will be remedied by
the courts. I believe that whatever improvements have been made
in the law concerning prisoners' constitutional rights and in prison
conditions have been almost solely due to the decisions of the federal
courts. These allegedly interventionist decisions have made it clear
that the courts can be relied on to protect the constitutional rights
of individuals when the other branches of government do not do so.
C. Desegregation
The desegregation cases decided by the Warren Court during
the 1950s and 1960s were particularly controversial. This was an area
of the law in which the Constitution, in section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, expressly provided for Congress to have broad enforce-
ment powers. But, despite this clear authority, Congress refused to
exercise its section 5 power to remedy the conditions of racial inequal-
ity that existed throughout our nation' by the time the Supreme Court
decided Brown v. Board of Education.'
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court in Brown, found that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments,"8 and concluded that "[s]uch an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms."'" In holding that separate but equal
educational facilities violated the fourteenth amendment's guarantee
of equal protection, the Court relied on the psychological effect of
segregation on school children: "To separate them from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a.way unlikely ever to be undone.""
82. See Wright, supra note 10, at 16 ("Congress had not worried about Negro
rights for almost seventy-five years [since the passage of the Civil War amendmentsr').
See also Cox, supra note 37, at 592:
It would have been best, no doubt, for the Congress to have taken the
initiative in compelling school desegregation, but legislative action was
blocked by the power of the Southern Congressmen and the filibuster.
The Executive theoretically could have given more leadership. As a prac-
tical matter, however, the task of initiating steps to realize a national
ideal fell to the Court; either it must act or nothing would be done.
83. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84. Id. at 493.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 494.
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Much of the criticism of the Brown decision is based upon the
Court's use of psychological or sociological data. "No court, say the
dissatisfied, has the competence or the jurisdiction to weigh evidence
which is 'sociological' rather than 'legal' in character. The impact of
school segregation upon the psychology of Negro children . . . [is]
political . . . , not legal .... and [is] properly the business of legislators,
not judges."87 To ignore this evidence from the social sciences,
however, would have been to ignore the facts. The justices did not
hold themselves out as having expertise or training in education or
psychology; rather, they relied on the best information available from
the experts."
Another criticism of Brown and the other desegregation deci-
sions was that the Court was acting "almost entirely without the sup-
port of Congress."9 Although it is certainly correct that the Supreme
Court led the way in protecting the constitutional rights of minority
groups,90 the support of Congress was forthcoming, as evidenced by
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 196491 and subsequent equal
rights legislation.2 As Judge J. Skelly Wright has noted, the Court
in Brown "awakened the nation's conscience" to the problem of racial
inequality.93 Although the principles espoused in the Brown decision
have been popularly accepted, controversy continues over how best
to effectuate those policies.
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Frank M. Johnson of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit has spoken eloquently on the subject of
judicial activism:
[I]t is my firm belief that the judicial activism which has
generated so much criticism is, in most instances, not ac-
tivism at all. Courts do not relish making such hard deci-
sions and certainly do not encourage litigation on social or
political problems. But . . . the federal judiciary . . . has
87. Bennet & Quade, supra note 60, at 96.
88. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 471-72.
89. Bennett & Quade, supra note 12, at 93.
90. See id. at 93 n.8 ("most of the civil rights trails have been blazed by the
Supreme Court").
91. 78 Stat. 252.
92. This is not to say that the Brown decision received immediate acceptance
by legislators and executive officials. In fact, there was a great deal of resistance
to lower court orders attempting to enforce the mandate in Brown by state and local
school officials. See generally A. BICKEL. supra note 17, at 256-58.
93. Wright, supra note 10, at 16.
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the paramount and continuing duty to uphold the law. When
a "case or controversy" is properly presented, the court may
not shirk its sworn responsibility to uphold the Constitu-
tion. . . . The courts are bound to take jurisdiction and
decide the issues-even though those decisions result in
criticism.... And, finally, I submit that history has shown,
with few exceptions, that decisions of the federal judiciary
over a period of time have become accepted and revered
as monuments memorializing the strength and stability of
this nation.94
The responsibility for trends in the development of the law,
whether in the direction of activism or judicial restraint, do not belong
solely to the members of the federal judiciary. Lawyers play a vital
role in shaping this development. The questions presented to judges
are framed by lawyers within the context of actual controversies. The
decisions of the court are many times influenced by the advocacy of
the lawyer; his creativity and persuasiveness often determine whether
the law stands still or moves forward.
The responsibility for the growth of the law and for its flexibil-
ity in meeting the changing needs of our society has never belonged
to the judiciary alone-or even to the legislative or executive branches
of government. That responsibility has always been shared by the
members of the legal profession. Therefore, the activist trends in
judicial decisions could not have come about without support from
the bar. Further, although the federal courts may often lead the way
in initiating change in some areas of constitutional law, these deci-
sions have become important because they have been accepted by the
public and the other branches of government.
Lawyers, judges, members of Congress, executive officials, and
state-elected officials share the responsibility for preserving the in-
dependence of the judiciary. The judicial branch must continue to be
insulated from political pressures in order to function properly; if the
independence of the judiciary is destroyed by the "court curbing" bills
now pending in Congress or by increased political answerability to
the electorate or to members of Congress, the only effective safeguard
against the infringement of constitutional rights will be lost."
94. Johnson, supra note 1, at 474-75.
95. Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, in a letter to the Editor of the
New York Times, March 6, 1982, has suggested that the news media have failed in
their duty to "alert the American people to the clear and present danger to constitu-
tional government presented by current efforts in Congress to limit the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court of the United States." I contend that this is the duty not only
of the media but more importantly of all of us who work in the legal profession.
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